





Countries differ widely in the age at which they first
track children into different types of schools. In the
majority of OECD countries, tracking takes place at
the age of 15 or 16,which means that there is no track-
ing until the 9th or 10th grade (Table). In contrast,
some countries – including most parts of Germany –
undertake the first tracking at the age of 10.Do such
institutional differences make a difference for the lev-
el and distribution of educational outcomes? 
This article reviews a series of comprehensive em-
pirical studies that use the international variation to
estimate the impact of tracking on student out-
comes,as measured by various international student
achievement tests.1 As with other institutional fea-
tures of the school system (see previous contribu-
tions to this journal (Woessmann 2003b, 2004)), in-
stitutional comparisons across countries lend them-
selves particularly well to ana-
lyze the effects of tracking.2
In this article,tracking refers to the placement of stu-
dents into different school types,hierarchically struc-
tured by performance. Such school placement poli-
cies are variously called tracking, streaming, ability
grouping,or selective (as opposed to comprehensive)
schooling. The advantages and drawbacks of early
tracking into differing-ability schools have been the
subject of heated debates in many countries, and re-
main so today. It is all the more surprising how little
empirical evidence is available about the actual ef-
fects of early tracking.
From a theoretical point of view, the effects of edu-
cational tracking are controversial.On the one hand,
those who favour early tracking believe that homo-
geneous classes contribute to a focused curriculum
and adequate progress, which could lead to an opti-
mal learning situation for all students. On the other
hand, it is conceivable that weaker students profit
from the presence of better students without the lat-
ter suffering.Thus, critics of early tracking generally
argue that the weaker groups are systematically dis-
advantaged if they are separated early on.Since the-
oretically,a wide variety of causal mechanisms is con-
ceivable – depending, among others, on the type of
peer effects assumed – the effects of educational
tracking are ultimately an empirical question.3
In general,education systems aim both for a high lev-
el of achievement as well as equality of opportunity
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School tracking in international comparison
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Note: Age when students are tracked for the first time.
 Source: OECD (2004).
* This article draws heavily on Woess-
mann (2009). I would like to thank Anne
Heritage for a first translation and Christa
Hainz for valuable comments.
** Ludger Woessmann is Professor of
Economics at the University of Munich
and heads the Department Human
Capital and Innovation at the Ifo Institute
for Economic Research.
1 The tests investigated in this article are:
PISA = Programme for International
Student Assessment, TIMSS = Trends in
International Mathematics and Science
Study, and PIRLS = Progress in Interna-
tional Reading Literacy Study.
2 See Woessmann (2003a, 2007b, 2007c)
and West and Woessmann (2009) for em-
pirically based analyses of additional re-
form possibilities in various areas of the
school system.
3See Meier and Schuetz (2008) for a more
comprehensive discussion of the theoret-
ical background.CESifo DICE Report 1/2009 27
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for all children.That is why in this article,we investi-
gate the effects of tracking both on the level and on
the inequality of educational performance. To moti-
vate these two goals, we start by briefly pointing out
that both have important long-term consequences.
First, the average level of educational performance of
the population is probably the most decisive factor for
the long-term growth of an economy (see Hanushek
and Woessmann 2008,2009).Countries that had better
results in the numerous international cognitive student
achievement tests of the past – i.e.,the predecessors of
PISA – have a significantly higher long-term per-capi-
ta growth of their gross domestic product (Figure 1).
Second, the distribution of economic prosperity is
closely related to the dispersion of educational per-
formance.Thus,most of the international differences
in earnings inequality can be at-
tributed to international differ-
ences in the inequality of educa-
tional achievement as measured
by test results (Nickell 2004).As
shown in Figure 2,there is a close
link between earnings inequality
and inequality in educational
performance. In contrast, mini-
mum wages and the degree of
unionisation among workers, for
example,seem to have little to do
with international differences in
earnings inequality.
In order to investigate whether
and how tracking influences ed-
ucational performance and in-
equality, one needs variation in
tracking.Since tracking is mostly a national feature,
this article exploits the international variation de-
picted in the Table. In addition, the cross-country
evidence will be compared to within-country evi-
dence from a federal country, Germany, where
tracking is a regional feature.
The next section analyzes in an international com-
parison whether early school tracking has an impact
on how the level and distribution of student achieve-
ment at the end of lower-secondary school develops
compared to the level and distribution already given
at the end of primary school.The subsequent two sec-
tions summarize two studies that compare countries
with and without early tracking in terms of whether
tracking is associated with the dependency of stu-
dents’ achievement on their family background – i.e.,
whether tracking aggravates in-
equality of educational opportu-
nity – once using the TIMSS stud-
ies, once using the PISA study.
The final section investigates the
same association across German
states and compares the results




The first study reviewed here,
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Figure 2sis on the empirical identification of the causal effect
of early tracking. They employ a method developed
especially for estimating the effects of tracking to en-
sure that the relationship between early tracking and
performance results in an international comparison is
not caused by other differences in the educational
systems of the countries investigated.4
The considerations of this approach start with the fact
that in all countries, students are taught in a uniform
school type for the first four years of schooling. It is
only at a later point in time that tracking begins in
some countries but not in others. Therefore, a com-
parison of the change in educational inequality be-
tween the end of primary school and towards the end
of lower-secondary school can provide information
on possible impacts of early tracking.The extent of in-
equality that exists in a country in 4th grade is clear-
ly not brought about by tracking.5As a consequence,
it makes sense to take this general level of inequality
out of the analysis and to consider only the change in
inequality that occurs after 4th grade in order to de-
termine the effect of early tracking on the extent of
inequality in school performance.The question is thus
how the dispersion of educational performance on in-
ternational tests develops between the end of prima-
ry school and the end of lower-secondary school.
Basically,this method involves an investigation of the
relationship depicted in Figure 3.The figure shows the
inequality in educational performance in PIRLS and
in PISA 2003 for all countries that participated in both
of these studies.Both PIRLS and PISA investigate the
reading competency of students.The measure for ed-
ucational inequality within a country is the standard
deviation in student test scores.It represents for every
country the average deviation of the individual test
results from the results of the national mean.6
The left-hand side of the figure depicts the inequali-
ty in the performance results of the PIRLS study,
which measures reading performance of students in
4th grade. Note that at this point, Germany does not
show any unusual inequality in students’ perfor-
mance.In 4th grade,Germany is still in the lower half
of countries who have relatively balanced student
performance.On the right-hand side,the figure shows
the inequality in educational performance in the
PISA 2003 study,which tests students at the age of 15,
i.e., towards the end of lower-secondary school. As
shown in the figure,Germany displays the largest in-
equality in the performance results at this stage.
The essence of the analysis now basically involves
comparing the change in inequality that occurs from
primary to lower-secondary school between countries
with and without educational tracking during this pe-
riod. When viewing the change between the perfor-
mance dispersion in PIRLS and PISA,that part of the
inequality measured at the end of lower-secondary
school that already existed at the end of primary
school is not taken into account.The change is indi-
cated by the lines that connect the two points of each
country. For countries with early tracking, black sol-
id connecting lines are used,while red dashed lines in-
dicate countries without early tracking. It is notice-
able that nearly all the black solid lines point upwards
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4 For a more comprehensive report of this study, its methodology
and additional results see Hanushek and Woessmann (2006).
5 To minimize potential anticipation effects, we also performed the
analysis with inequality in 3rd grade rather than 4th grade for a study
that contains 3rd-grade results,obtaining similar qualitative results.
6 Alternative measures of inequality, such as the difference in per-
formance between the best and the worst 5 percent (or 25 percent)
of students, yield similar results.
Notes: Dispersion of student achievement measured as standard deviation
of test scores in primary school (PIRLS) in comparison to lower-secondary
school (PISA 2003), in both cases measured as difference to the interna-
tional mean of national standard deviations in each test. The lines indicate
the change in performance dispersion from primary to lower-secondary
school. The black solid lines indicate school systems that track their stu-
dents into different school types before the age of 16, while the red
dashed lines refer to those school systems that do not track their students
by this age.
Source: Based on Hanushek and Woessmann (2006).CESifo DICE Report 1/2009 29
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whereas nearly all the red dashed lines point down-
wards. This means that in countries that track their
students into different school types, inequality in-
creases systematically, whereas in countries where
there is no tracking it decreases systematically (rela-
tive to the mean change in the sample). Of all coun-
tries, Germany is the one in which inequality in-
creases the most between the end of primary school
and the end of lower-secondary school.
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) transform this
graphic depiction into econometric estimates based
on a differences-in-differences approach:The differ-
ence between countries with and without early track-
ing is investigated in terms of the difference in in-
equality between primary and lower-secondary
school.The results show that early tracking leads to a
systematic increase in inequality of student perfor-
mance between the end of the primary and the end
of lower-secondary school.This result is confirmed by
various alternative model specifications and by the
analysis of numerous additional pairs of internation-
al student achievement tests in primary and sec-
ondary school, including the various TIMSS tests. In
total,eight different pairs of tests in primary and sec-
ondary schools were taken into account,combining a
total of 176 observations.
In contrast to the results concerning the effects on in-
equality,the results on the performance level are less
clear. But there is little evidence that early tracking
would increase the performance level. To the con-
trary, in the most comprehensive model there is a
negative effect of early tracking on the average per-
formance level which is statistically marginally sig-
nificant. Additionally, performance is evaluated at
different percentiles of the performance distribution.
The results indicate that not even for the best 5 per-
cent of students is there a positive effect of early
tracking.
The impact of family background on performance
in TIMSS 
In the previous investigation, the focus has been on
the dispersion of student performance as a measure
for the inequality of performance.Whereas in a pos-
itive analysis the results have a sizeable effect, it is
not per se clear whether such a dispersion measure
can be seen as normatively relevant because the dis-
persion does not necessarily tell us anything about
the actual inequality of opportunity. That is why
Schuetz, Ursprung and Woessmann (2008) investi-
gate a more direct measure for the inequality of op-
portunity: the extent to which individual student
performance depends on the family background of
the students.7
In national and international student achievement
tests,it has been shown that almost without exception
family background plays the most important role in
influencing students’ performance.The extent of fam-
ily influence is, however, not unalterable.As report-
ed below, there is considerable difference between
countries. If the extent of family influence is seen as
measure of inequality of opportunity that an educa-
tional system offers children from various family
backgrounds, then countries vary in terms of the ex-
tent to which equality of opportunity is achieved.The
study by Schuetz, Ursprung and Woessmann (2008)
investigates whether these international differences
in equality of opportunity are systematically related
to the school policies of the countries.
The study combines the international TIMSS student
achievement test of 1995 with the repeat study
TIMSS-Repeat of 1999, which test performance in
mathematics and natural sciences in 8th grade,at the
age of approximately 14.Micro data are available for
over 325,000 students from a total of 54 countries.The
study uses the number of books available in a house-
hold as a proxy for socio-economic background.Since
the multivariate analysis takes into account the ef-
fects of immigration status of the student, the moth-
er and the father (as well as age, gender and family
status), the estimates are limited to the association
between student performance and family background
in the non-migrant population of each country.
Figure 4 shows the resulting measure for inequality
of opportunity in a country,measured as the effect of
family background on students’ achievements in
mathematics and science for selected OECD coun-
tries.8 The results indicate that in every country in-
vestigated,students with a high socio-economic back-
ground have a statistically significant lead vis-à-vis
students with a low socio-economic background.
7 Such an operationalisation draws on the concept of equality of op-
portunity as defined by Roemer (1998; see also Betts and Roemer
2007).The central idea of the concept is that inequality should on-
ly be tolerated to the extent that there are differences in an indi-
vidual’s effort – not,however,due to differences beyond the control
of the individual (for example, as a consequence of gender, race, or
family background).For details of the methods,data,and results of
the reported study, see Schuetz, Ursprung and Woessmann (2008).
8 For the estimated measure for inequality of opportunity in those
of the 54 countries not shown in Figure 4,see Schuetz,Ursprung and
Woessmann (2008).In addition, the results show clear differences in
equality of opportunity between the countries stud-
ied.Germany,for example,ranks fourth among those
OECD countries that are most unequal. Thus,
Germany shows a particularly strong association be-
tween the performance of students and their particu-
lar socio-economic background, compared to other
countries. The only two countries with greater in-
equality are the United Kingdom (England and
Scotland) and Hungary.The countries with the great-
est equality in this study are France and Canada.
How can we account for the fact that the equality of
opportunity for children from different family back-
grounds in the countries studied differs so widely?
To analyze the possible effects of education policies
on the differences in opportunity equality empiri-
cally, the study relates the measure of inequality of
opportunity in the various countries to systemic
characteristics of their education policies.
The study shows that inequality of opportunity is sig-
nificantly smaller, the later the tracking age of stu-
dents is. The sooner students are placed in different
school types, the greater the dependence of student
performance on family background.9 If tracking is
postponed by four years, for example, the impact of
family background on test scores
declines by one quarter of the en-
tire impact of the family back-
ground averaged across the
OECD countries (see Figure 4).
The international comparison al-
so reveals that, apart from later
tracking, a comprehensive sys-
tem of pre-school education is
another way of establishing larg-
er equality of opportunity for
children from different family
backgrounds.
With this model,it is also possible
to investigate the relationship be-
tween tracking and the average
level of performance.The associ-
ation between the age of the student when tracking
begins and the average performance level of a coun-
try turns out not to be statistically significant.
However, the point estimates are positive in the var-
ious models, indicating that the tendency is for the
performance level to be lowered rather than raised by
early tracking.
The impact of family background on performance
in PISA 2003 
Another study by Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz
and West (2009) investigates the same association be-
tween tracking and equality of opportunity on the ba-
sis of micro data from the PISA 2003 study.In a com-
parable econometric specification, it investigates
whether achievement in mathematics and science of
the tested 15-year-old students is associated more
closely with their family background if school track-
ing into different school types takes place at an ear-
lier age. The analysis is based on data for around
180,000 students from 27 countries. The Index of
Economic,Social and Cultural Status (ESCS) as pro-
vided by the PISA study is used as an alternative mea-
sure for family background.10
The qualitative results with the alternative data and
measures are the same: the association between test
scores and family background is significantly smaller,
the higher the age of first tracking.This association is
depicted in Figure 5: in countries with earlier track-
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Source: Based on Schuetz, Ursprung and Woessmann (2008).
EDUCATION POLICIES AND INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN TIMSS
Notes: Estimated effect of three education policies on the inequality of educational opportunity (measured as 
the impact of family background on TIMSS student performance in test-score points), plotted against the entire 
extent of inequality of opportunity in selected OECD countries.
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9Ammermüller (2005) reports similar results based on the interna-
tional PIRLS and PISA data.Waldinger (2007) uses a combination
of the approach of Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) and Schuetz,
Ursprung and Woessmann (2008) and tends to find statistically in-
significant results, but this may be largely due to limited degrees of
freedom in samples of only 8–14 countries and a less informative
tracking measure.Brunello and Checchi (2007) use the internation-
al approach described here for results beyond school age, finding
that tracking increases the effect of family background on earnings
in the labour market.
10See Woessmann,Luedemann,Schuetz and West (2009) for further
details of this study.CESifo DICE Report 1/2009 31
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ing, the difference in performance between children
with different socio-economic backgrounds is con-
siderably larger.
As the figure reveals,this effect arises primarily from
the fact that children with low socio-economic status
in countries with later tracking perform considerably
better.At the same time, children from families with
a relatively high socio-economic status perform at ap-
proximately the same level.Accordingly,with respect
to the average performance level in PISA 2003, the
overall effect of later tracking is positive, albeit not
statistically significant (see Woessmann,Luedemann,
Schuetz and West 2009).
A comparison of within-German and international
evidence using PISA-E 2003 
Can the cross-country analyses be trusted, or are
there omitted factors at the country level such as dif-
ferences in culture,language or legal background that
may account for the reported associations? One way
to test this is to perform analyses within a country
with a common culture, language and jurisdiction in
which the tracking regime differs across regions.
Therefore, the study by Woessmann (2007a) investi-
gates the association between school tracking and
equality of opportunity in a comparison of German
states (Länder).11Even though tracking into different
school types – usually Hauptschule, Realschule and
Gymnasium – occurs at an early age everywhere in
Germany, there are small differ-
ences between the states. In
Brandenburg and Berlin,there is
a six-year comprehensive prima-
ry school,and only thereafter are
the students separated into dif-
ferent school types. In all other
states, tracking takes place al-
ready after 4th grade (in some
cases with an orientation phase).
The advantage of an analysis
within one country is that poten-
tially remaining distortions of the
international results due to un-
observed, e.g., cultural, hetero-
geneity, can be excluded. Such a
study is also particularly relevant
for the German context.The disadvantage of such an
analysis lies above all in the limited statistical degrees
of freedom as a result of the small number of 16 state
observations.12
In the state comparison,the slope of the so-called so-
cio-economic gradient in the German PISA exten-
sion PISA-E 2003 is used as the measure for the in-
equality of opportunity.It indicates again how strong-
ly student performance varies with the PISA-defined
ESCS index of economic, social and cultural status.
The steeper the slope, the stronger the influence of
family background on test performance of students,
and the smaller the extent to which the principle of
equal opportunity is realized.To allow for a fair com-
parison between states, the socio-economic gradient
is adjusted in a multivariate analysis for the facts that
states with a heterogeneous population (such as city
states) and those with a weak economy tend to
achieve less equality of educational opportunities.
As the results reported in Figure 6 indicate, the ad-
justed socio-economic gradient in the two states with
later tracking, namely Brandenburg and Berlin, is
lower than in every other state.Thus, the association
between student performance and socio-economic
background is significantly lower in both states with
later tracking. Also in Germany, it holds true that
equality of opportunity for children from disadvan-















Notes: Low and high socio-economic status correspond to the 25
th and 75
th percentile of the PISA ESCS 
index, respectively. Performance difference in relationship to the lowest result category after exclusion of 
numerous additional factors.
Source: Based on Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz and West (2009).
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11 For details of the study reported in this section, its methodology
and numerous further detailed results, see Woessmann (2007a).
12 Unfortunately,the PISA-E micro data are not available in a form
that allows a corresponding analysis to be made at the student lev-
el.Therefore,the 16 states constitute the level of observation of this
study.Similar to the international results,this does not come
at the cost of lower average performance:There is no
statistically significant association between the age of
first tracking and the average performance level.The
point estimate is negative, however, which again
points more towards a performance-reducing than a
performance-increasing effect of early tracking.The
results for both equality of opportunity and perfor-
mance level are extremely robust in terms of taking
into account further control variables. Thus, consid-
eration of indicators for city states or Eastern states
and of other variables, ranging from the political na-
ture of the state governments to the make-up of vot-
ers and the extent of expenditures for the school sys-
tem, do not change the results.
Not only the age when school tracking sets in, but al-
so the number of school types differs across German
states. The Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and
Thuringia,for example,have only two school types to
choose from – i.e., there is only one other secondary
school type in addition to the Gymnasium.As with the
age when tracking begins,the German state study re-
veals a significant positive association of less tracking
with equality of opportunity: In states with fewer
school types,the opportunity for children from disad-
vantaged backgrounds is significantly higher,without
the performance level suffering.Equality of opportu-
nity is particularly lower when only a small share of
students attends the lowest track, the Hauptschule.
In contrast,there is no systematic difference in equal-
ity of opportunity or performance level between
states with and without the so-called Gesamtschulen
(a “comprehensive” school type that is available in
addition and next to the existing selective school
types). Once further factors are taken into account,
states with Gesamtschulen do not have a significant-
ly lower performance. However, the traditional
promise of putting Gesamtschulen next to the exist-
ing school types to improve equality of opportunity
is not achieved either.
What is more,the study shows that the effects of ear-
ly tracking and of the number of school types that are
found in the comparison of German states are simi-
larly significant in the international PISA compari-
son of the OECD countries.If the German states are
analyzed together with the OECD countries in a sam-
ple of 42 to 54 observations,neither the effect of ear-
ly tracking nor the effect of the number of school
types differs significantly between the two observa-
tion groups. What is true for the international com-
parison is also true for Germany – suggesting that the
international results are unlikely to be biased sub-
stantially by cross-country differences in culture,lan-
guage, legal structures or the like.
Conclusions
The studies reviewed in this article investigate the in-
ternational association of school tracking with the
level and equality of opportunity of student perfor-
mance. The results show that the dispersion of edu-
cational performance increases considerably more
between primary school and lower-secondary school
in systems that track students into differing-ability
schools compared to school systems that remain com-
prehensive. In addition, the effect of family back-
ground on individual student performance is shown
to be weaker, the later tracking into different school
types takes place. Additionally, equality of opportu-
nity tends to be higher in school systems that have
fewer school types, once tracking has taken place.
At the same time, later tracking does not go hand in
hand with a drop in the performance level.The esti-
mated effects are generally statistically insignificant,
but in all four studies they point towards better rather
than poorer performance levels with later tracking.
In general,however,tracked school systems appear to
achieve approximately the same average level of stu-
dent performance as non-tracked school systems.
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states with tracking after grades 4 and 6, respectively, after excluding the 
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The international evidence presented in this article
is corroborated in various studies based on varia-
tions that exist within certain countries. In line with
the within-German cross-state evidence presented
here, Dustmann (2004) shows that in Germany, the
choice of school type is closely associated with
parental background,which translates into substan-
tial earnings differences later in life. Bauer and
Riphahn (2006) find that early tracking reduces in-
tergenerational mobility in a comparison of Swiss
cantons.Exploiting certain variations across schools
within the Netherlands, van Elk, van der Steeg and
Webbink (2009) find that early tracking reduces par-
ticipation in and completion of higher education,
without having a positive effect on those placed in
the upper track.
Apart from the (usually limited) cross-sectional vari-
ation in some countries,another type of identification
is possible if educational tracking varies over time
within a country because of educational reforms.
Thus, Meghir and Palme (2005) investigate the re-
form of educational tracking in Sweden in the 1950s
and Pekkarinen, Uusitalo and Pekkala (2006) the
Finnish reform in the 1970s. Exploiting the fact that
both reforms were implemented gradually in differ-
ent municipalities in a differences-in-differences
framework, both studies find that the postponement
of school tracking reduced later inequality on the
labour market.13
Thus,both the international and several pieces of na-
tional evidence consistently show that the earlier the
school tracking,the greater the impact of family back-
ground on educational success.The data show clear-
ly that later school tracking increases equality of op-
portunity. At the same time, later tracking is not as-
sociated with a lower performance level.Thus, there
is no indication of an apparent trade-off between the
goals of equality and efficiency in the organisation of
school systems.
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